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In Jack v. Jack, 18 the plaintiff contended that the insurer must
bear the burden of proving that its settlements were reasonable
and made in good faith. The court flatly rejected this contention,
placing the burden squarely upon the plaintiff attacking the
settlements.
Recently, there has arisen a conflict between primary and
excess insurers over the question whether the primary insurer is
obligated to defend the excess insurer when both carriers are
joined in the suit. The issue now seems well settled that the
4
primary insurer has no obligation to defend the excess carrier.

PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION: LAW AND PROCEDURE
Melvin G. Dakin*
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
In Truck Service Inc. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,' an application for contract carriage of certain steel products was granted with modifications. A motor carrier having
common carrier authority from the commission intervened in
the proceeding and opposed the application on the ground that
existing common carrier service was adequate to serve the shipper. The applicant sought to show an inadequacy in present service by evidence that it was not economical for a common carrier
to maintain the necessary trucks or trailers readily available for
shipper's exclusive use. The applicant also showed that the common carrier had only intrastate authority and that interline connections would be required if the traffic were to be handled by
the common carrier. Special need was allegedly shown by evidence that these disadvantages would be remedied by the contract carrier. Our supreme court affirmed the granting of the
application by the commission. In doing so it alluded to the
United States Supreme Court holding in I.C.C. v. J. T. Transport
Co., 2 and noted that:
13. 240 So.2d 435 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).

14. Lumberman's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 239 So.2d
472 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Fusilier v. Dixie Auto Ins. Co. 238 So.2d 223
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 256 La. 343, 236 So.2d 491 (1970).
2. 368 U.S. 81 (1961).
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"Adequacy in existing service is a factor to be considered
by the Commission, but adequacy of the existing service or
the willingness or ability of existing carriers to render the
service is not necessarily determinative .... [w]hen the
need and convenience are supported by the evidence, the
law should not stand in the way if the public convenience
and necessity are not otherwise jeopardized." 8
It is to be noted that it was in the J. T. Transport Co. case that
the United States Supreme Court stated that the proper procedure in contract carriage cases is
"[F]or the applicant first to demonstrate that the undertaking it proposes is specialized and tailored to a shipper's distinct need. The protestants then may present evidence to
show they have the ability as well as the willingness to meet
that specialized need. If that is done, then the burden shifts
to the applicant to demonstrate that it is better equipped to
meet the distinct needs of the shipper than the protestants."4
Our motor carrier regulatory statute specifically provides
that "no person shall at the same time hold, or operate under,
both a common carrier certificate and a contract carrier permit.
•5 In American Courier Corp. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission,6 the commission granted a common carrier certificate to the wholly-owned subsidiary of a parent corporation with
a permit for contract carriage of money transfers between banks;
the subsidiary, operating under such common carrier certificate,
would then transport audit media processed by bank computers
not within the permit of its parent. Our supreme court rejected
an emasculating interpretation of the statute by a district court
which in effect read "no person shall" as meaning that "no one
legal entity shall" hold both a common carrier certificate and a
contract carrier permit. Noting that the parent and subsidiary
operated practically as one corporation and that the special position of the parent would encourage discrimination in channeling
traffic to its subsidiary, the court annulled the certificate of common carriage granted by the commission.
The Louisiana constitution provides that "the power, authority and duties of the [Public Service] Commission shall af3.
4.
5.
6.

256
368
LA.
256

La. 343, 348-49, 236 So.2d 491, 493 (1970).
U.S. at 90.
R.S. 45:165 (1950).
LA. 464, 236 So.2d 802 (1970).
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fect and include all manners of things connected with, concerning, and growing out of the service to be given or rendered by
* . . public utilities .... -7 A statute also defines a public utility
as "any person furnishing electric service ..... 8 These provisions were deemed adequate, in LouisianaPower and Light Co. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission,9 to sustain a commission
order requiring a utility to install a master metering system in
an apartment complex, thus making applicable a commercial rate
for the electricity used. Relief was requested because the utility
had refused to convert a portion of the complex to a master system, the utility maintaining that to order the conversion would
constitute an expropriation of its property. The record indicated,
however, that the apartment owners were willing to reimburse
the utility for such conversion. Under these circumstances the
court found not only ample power and justification to sustain the
service order, but also no expropriation. Upon refusal of the
utility to comply with the order the apartment owner moved,
first before the commission and subsequently before a district
court, that the utility be ordered to show cause why it should
not be held in contempt for failure to comply. 10 A request for
a jury trial was denied by the trial court on the ground that the
contempt was only constructive and therefore triable by summary process. A court of appeal justified denial of jury trial on
the ground that state procedure required a jury request to be
made not later than ten days after the service of the last pleading;11 the motion for jury trial could thus be held untimely and
the issue as to whether it was available at all was not determined.
In 1954 the commission implemented a basic tenet of public
utility regulation in issuing a general order that extension of
mains shall not be made by a water or gas public utility that will
duplicate the service of another like utility serving the same
commodity, nor shall extension be made to serve customers that
could be served by a public utility already in existence in an
economic and justifiable manner."' 2 In Louisiana Gas Service
Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission, 8 a subdivision
7. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
8. LA. R.S. 45:121 (1950).
9. 256 LA. 656, 237 So.2d 673 (1970).
10. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 244
So.2d 296 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
11. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1732.
12. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, General Order, January 18, 1954.
13. 256 LA. 536, 237 So.2d 369 (1970).
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owner had built a connecting gas line to a utility but had been
unable to work out a satisfactory service contract; the line was
sold to a competing utility after a satisfactory contract had been
negotiated. The rejected utility then made successful application to the commission for an order granting it the exclusive
right to serve the subdivision with natural gas; the second utility
sought annulment of that order based on the ground that duplication of facilities and consequent violation of the commission's
general order would otherwise result. Our supreme court quashed
the commission order as arbitrary and unreasonable since it
would precipitate rather than avoid duplication of existing facilities, in view of the fact that the connecting pipeline was now
owned by the second utility; the opinion did not explore whether
there would be duplication involved in making the connection
by the second public utility.
In Denegre v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,14 the
commission had before it an application to relocate a railroad
spur in order to enhance usability of servient property. Nearby
property owners protested on the ground that relocation of the
spur would deprive them of service. Relocation of the servitude
was urged as permissible under a Civil Code article providing
that a servitude of passage may be changed from one place to
another by the owner of the servient estate if its usage is inconvenient and burdensome, provided a place convenient for exercise
of the servitude is offered. 15 The Louisiana Supreme Court held
the provisions inapplicable to a servitude voluntarily granted and
further noted that for the commission to order the relocation, a
showing would be required that the public convenience and necessity warranted the relief sought, or at least that it would not
be adversely affected by the relocation or continuance. A concurring Justice agreed that the public convenience and interest
might be adversely affected in the circumstances here but disagreed as to the inapplicability of Civil Code article 777, noting
that its position in the Code made it applicable even though the
servitude had been established by agreement or judgment.
In an effort to win some interim relief by way of a rate increase under bond, the utility, in South Central Bell Telephone
Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Commission,16 went to court
14. 257 LA. 503, 242 So.2d 832 (1970).
15. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 703, 753, 777.
16. 256 La. 497, 236 So.2d 813 (1970).
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seeking an injunction against the commission's enforcement of
an existing tariff or interference with imposition of higher tariffs
pending commission determination of reasonable and just rates
and charges. The petitioner based its case for relief on the fact
that it was earning a rate of return of 5.87% on its net average
investment, whereas a rate of 8.5% was deemed necessary. It cited
evidence from elsewhere in the country of rates of this magnitude being allowed, noting that New York allowed an 8.15 percent
rate of return on average investment. It alleged that the rate of
return permitted by the commission was confiscatory and subjected it to the threat of irreparable injury, since no means was
provided by law for the commission to give retroactive rate increases. Our supreme court held the utility had failed to establish the rates as confiscatory or as imposing irreparable injury
pending final determination of a justified rate of return and
tariffs necessary to yield such return by the commission17
Dissenting justices urged that to avoid confiscation, according to a previous holding of the court, "the return to the equity
owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in
other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital."1 8 (Emphasis added.) However, the only data
cited in support of possible confiscation was that 1960 cost of debt
capital was approximately 4.9%, whereas in 1969 such cost was
in excess of 8% and in some instances higher. No data was apparently submitted to the court as to either the present return
on equity capital or whether that return violated this definition
of confiscation. The majority conceded that it might well be that
the utility should receive a higher rate of return on its total investment, but concluded that it did not have a record before it
which justified finding that the present 6% rate of return was so
inadequate as to be confiscatory.' 9
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS
In Wlochowicz v. Forbes20 a probationary institutional em17. Id. at 506, 236 So.2d at 816-17.
18. Id at 514, 236 So.2d at 819, quoting from Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
19. South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. La. Pub. Service Comm'n, 256
La. 497, 505, 236 So.2d 813, 816 (1970).
20. 248 So.2d 69 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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ployee appealed to the state civil service commission on the
ground that his federal constitutional right to due process had
been violated in the termination of his services and cancellation
of civil service eligibility. The appointing authority moved to
dismiss on the ground that there were no legal requirements for
specification of grounds or charges in the cancellation-of-eligibility notices; the only attack available to the probationary employee was stated to be the cancellation of eligibility on a discriminatory basis. In his appeal the employee alleged discrimination but not specific discriminatory actions and procedures.
A court of appeal held that, absent such allegations, the appeal
to the civil service commission had not been perfected and was
hence properly dismissed.
In 1964 the legislature extended tenure protection of municipal firemen by providing mandatory civil service for all such
firemen in towns within the class of 7,000-13,000 population. Provision was made for the creation of local civil service boards to
hear appeals, and for further appeal from a board to a district
court.21 However, no amendment to the constitution was proposed or adopted authorizing an appeal from the board to the
courts. In Albert v. Parish of Rapides,22 our supreme court held
that, in the absence of such constitutional authority, jurisdiction
of the district courts could not be enlarged.
In Ragusa v. Department of Public Safety Division of State
Police,28 a court of appeal held that conduct of an Assistant
Superintendent of State Police, in using his police position for
economic betterment of himself and family, was a proper basis
for disciplinary action; hence dismissal was proper. The defense
invoked was that the conduct in question had been condoned by
prior appointing authority and the charge was hence stale;
Cormier v. Board of Institutions24 was cited for the proposition
that "stale" charges should be disregarded. However, the court
noted that in Cormier the stale charges had been resurrected for
personal or political motives and for this reason were not permitted to serve as a basis for disciplinary action; "we make it
clear, however," the court said in Cormier, "that we do not mean
21. La. Acts 1964, No. 282, now LA. R.S. 33:2561 (1950).
22. 256 La. 566, 237 So.2d 380 (1970).

23. 238 So.2d 193 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
24. 230 So.2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969), commented upon, The Work
of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 Term-Administrative
Regulation: Law and Procedure, 31 LA. L. REv. 297 (1971).
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charges of improper conduct concealed through design, artifice,
or in collaboration or collusion with former boards, superiors,.
or employers, may never be grounds for disciplinary action or
dismissal by subsequent Boards, superiors or employers who bare
25
concealed wrongdoing on the part of a classified employee."
In this case the charges, though delayed by prior authority, were
the real motive for the disciplinary actions and, since not disproved, sustained the dismissal.
In Montgomery v. Municipal Employees Civil Service Board
of Rayne,20 an employee argued that he was never discharged
by the "appointing authority" since, although he received a statement in writing of his dismissal, it did not include reasons. 27 A
court of appeal held that an employee would lose the right to a
statement of "complete reasons" for his dismissal upon failure
to request an investigation by civil service "within 15 days after
the action."
2
In Serio v. New Orleans Police Department,
8 a court of appeal had occasion to apply the constitutional provision making
commission findings final on the facts and granting an appeal
only on questions of law. The issue was solely whether the commission had properly resolved credibility issues presented in
the testimony; the finding was amply supported by the testimony
believed by the commission. Since, as the court noted, resolving
a credibility issue is purely a matter of fact, and no issues of law
were presented, the court affirmed the decision of the commission.

In Harmon v. Louisiana Wildlife and FisheriesCommission,29
the appellant was also held to have tendered only issues of fact
to the court of appeal since the findings of the commission were
supported by evidence; dismissing the appeal, the court noted
that it is only where the record is "barren" of any evidence to
support findings that a question of law arises. The court noted
that in Cottingham v. Department of Revenue, State of Louisiana,80 our supreme court stated that "where the decision is based
25. 230 So.2d at 312.
26. 248 So.2d 621 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
27. Had he received only oral notification of his dismissal he might
have invoked Young v. Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans, 228
La. 708, 77 So.2d 13 (1954), where our supreme court held that the appeal
period did not begin to run until notification in writing had been made.
See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 TermAdministrative Law, 16 LA. L. REv. 282 (1956).
28. 242 So.2d 62 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
29. 244 So.2d 922 (La, App. 1st Cir. 1971).
30. 232 La. 546, 94 So.2d 662 (1957). see note 32 infra.
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on substantial evidence the court may not consider the weight
or sufficiency of the evidence," but in Mayerhafer v. Department
of Police, New Orleans,81 it required that the findings be supported by probative evidence. Then, in King v. Department of
Public Safety, 82 the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that it
would not review questions of fact as found by the commission
so long as there was "any" evidence in the record to support
the commission's findings, somewhat impugning the Mayerhafer
requirement. In this posture of the jurisprudence, the court in
Harmon took the position that it was not concerned "with the
determination of whether the evidence is substantial or probative
so long as there is evidence in the record on which a finding of
fact might be determined by the Civil Service Commission." 3
The employee had admitted misconduct leading to his dismissal
but sought to defend on the ground that he was authorized and
justified in doing so; since there was evidence that the employee
neither had the authority nor was justified in filing improper
time sheets and making improper purchases with credit cards,
the conclusion of the commission upholding the dismissal of the
employee was affirmed.
In Jones v. Louisiana Department of Highways,3 4 however,
a court of appeal indicated that it would treat a decision of the
civil service commission as devoid of any evidence to support
it where the only showing was that an inspection engineer failed
on occasion to work a full 8-hour day when the work of the engineer required him to travel across the state and to correlate
travel time with the availability of equipment for inspection.
The evidence before the commission indicated that the engineer
submitted routine time schedules and that, in a number of instances, he was shown to have deviated therefrom; other evidence indicated some infractions of regulations with respect to
reimbursement for meals. The court cited the case of Leggett v.
Northwestern State College85 for the proposition that "there
must be a real and substantial relation between the conduct of
the employee and the efficient operation of the public service;
31. 235 La. 437, 104 So.2d 163 (1958). See note 32 infra.
32. 236 La. 602, 108 So.2d 524 (1959); cottingham, Mayerhaser, and King
are commented upon in 19 LA. L. REv. at 354-57 (1959).
33. 244 So.2d at 927, quoting from Gremillion v. Department of Highways, 129 So.2d 805, 809 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
34. 237 So.2d 916 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
35. 242 La. 927, 140 So.2d 5 (1962), commented upon, 23 LA. L. REv. 122
(1962).
*
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otherwise legal cause is not present and any disciplinary action
by the Commission is arbitrary and capricious." In that case the
supreme court also noted that "if there is any evidence before
the commission from which a conclusion can be drawn that the
employee's conduct is prejudicial to the service, the commission's
ruling will not be disturbed .... ,,36 The court of appeal then
concluded that there was no real and substantial relation between
the conduct of the employee as to time reports and meal reimbursements and the "efficient operation of the public service";
the determination of the commission upholding the dismissal of
the engineer was hence deemed to be without any evidence to
support it, and reinstatement of the engineer with full rights
was ordered.
A civil service rule of the New Orleans Police Department
provides that "if an employee of the Police Department is injured
directly in the performance of his duty for the protection of life
and property, the employee shall be granted additional sick leave
with pay which shall not be charged against his ordinary sick
leave accumulation .... ." In Bell v. New Orleans Police De7
partment,3
an injury allegedly within the foregoing provision
was suffered by an officer and a portion of his absence was treated
as paid sick leave. However, police department procedure required submission of the matter to the city department of civil
service which in turn requested advice from the civil service
commission. The commission denied paid sick leave status for
a substantial portion of the absence. Thereafter, at the suggestion of the police department, the officer put the matter before
the civil service commission again, using the vehicle of a motion
for summary judgment with attached stipulations respecting
the facts of the injury. The motion was filed more than 30 days
after the date on which the police department amended its disposition of the charge for sick leave to accord with the ruling
from the civil service commission; the appeal was dismissed
because not prosecuted within 30 days of adverse action by the
appointing authority. A court of appeal held the motion timely
filed with the commission because, while the police department
disposed of the matter in accordance with the commission's directive, it had encouraged the officer to appeal, thus rendering
the action non-adverse in character. This would seem to make
36. Id. at 939, 140 So.2d at 10.
37. 244 So.2d 339 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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the spirit in which adverse action was taken by the police department determinative rather than the adverse action itself,
hardly a satisfactory criterion. It would have seemed preferable
for the commission to regard its action as the reconsideration,
on the basis of additional evidence, of a matter already submitted
to the commission, in which event the 30-day limitation on appeals need not have been effective. Had the matter been so
treated, the commission might still have been directed on remand to give consideration to the additional stipulated facts
without so straining the meaning of "adverse action by the
appointing authority."
What would have been a serious encroachment upon the
authority of the state civil service commission to prepare and
put into effect new pay plans was held unconstitutional by our
supreme court in Louisiana Civil Service League v. Forbes.1s
Pursuant to its powers under the constitution authorizing changes
in salaries of public officers,39 the legislature enacted a new pay
scale for the state police; however, in view of the fact that these
officers are classified as employees under the civil service commission, their pay scales are also subject to commission determination. The court held that the authority of
the commission,
as the most recent provision in the constitution, 40 was controlling. All employees who are under civil service, whether public
officers or not, are governed by it; only public officers not subject to civil service may have their salaries altered without commission action.
DIVISION

OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

The continuing interest of employers in safeguarding their
experience-rating record against charges for improperly paid
benefits brought a number of cases to the courts of appeal during
the term. In American Sugar Co. v. Doyle, 41 a number of employees temporarily laid off by their employer claimed unemployment compensation benefits and were challenged by the
employer on the ground that they were actually receiving wages
during the layoff period by virtue of a guaranteed annual wage,
provision in a union agreement. In support of its position the
38. 258 La. 390, 246 So.2d 800 (1971).
39. LA. CONST. art. III, § 34.
40. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 15.

41. 237 So.2d 415 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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employer cited the Neirotko 42 case holding that for social security purposes back pay awarded in a labor dispute was deemed
wages. This plausible precedent was distinguished on the
ground that it was reached in order to achieve the legislative
objective of broad coverage for social security, whereas a holding that guaranteed annual wages constituted receipt of wages
during a period of temporary layoff would defeat the legislative
objectives of the unemployment compensation statute. 48 The
court further noted that claims for guaranteed annual wages
could be made only after the end of the year; it was unwilling
to make the assumptions necessary to apportion such hypothetical payments to current periods of unemployment during
the working year. The employees were held not disqualified
from receiving benefits.
Employers' efforts were more successful in a number of
other cases during the term disqualifying claimants for the payment of benefits on the ground that they had left their jobs without good cause connected with the employment. 4 4 However, in
South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Administrator, Division of
Employment Security45 the employer lost on the rather signifi-

cant issue that employees leaving work voluntarily with a leave
of absence and no assurance of work at the end of such leave
have nonetheless not "left work voluntarily" if, at the end of
such leave, application is made for re-employment and refused
because of lack of positions; the employee was deemed entitled
to benefits commencing with the expiration of the leave of absence.
LOUISIANA WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES COMMISSION
46
In Mares v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission,
a mandamus proceeding was successfully used to recover alligator hides seized by the commission because the owner had
failed to report them after the close of the season. Under the
regulatory statute, possession of unreported hides was made
subject to criminal punishment; confiscated hides served as evidence of the crime. The criminal trial having established that
42. Social Security Bd. v. Neirotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946).
43. 237 So.2d 415, 418 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
44. Moore v. Doyal, 240 So.2d 17 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Lee v. Doyal,
240 So.2d 19 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
45. 247 So.2d 615 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
46. 236 So.2d 650 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970).
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the seized hides had not been properly reported to the commission, such hides could then be sold for the benefit of the state.
However, in this case the statute of limitations had been permitted to run on the crime and there was thus no trial to establish that the hides had been properly confiscated by the state;
the statute provided no administrative hearing or other procedure for the determination of this issue. In these circumstances,
the court concluded that retention of the hides by the commission was a deprivation of property without due process of law
and ordered the return of the hides to the plaintiffs. It did not
give consideration to the possibility of judicial review of the
administrative determination that the hides had been illegally
taken, since the authority to confiscate and sell seemed so clearly
correlated with successful prosecution of the crime of failure to
report any hides taken. Regulation of the industry would seem
strengthened by provision for an administrative determination
which would sustain confiscation in addition to, or in lieu of,
the criminal prosecution now solely relied upon.
BOARD OF REGISTRATION FOR PROFESSIONAL

ENGINEERS AND LAND SURVEYORS
The regulatory statute licensing professional engineers does
not provide a hearing prior to denial of a license, but does provide an appeal thereafter to the civil district court for the Parish
of Orleans. An applicant may be licensed if he is a graduate
of an accredited engineering school or if he has had eight years
of experience in satisfactory engineering work and passes an
examination; he may also be licensed without an examination
if he has had twenty years of successful practice, at least twelve
of which have been in responsible charge of important engi47
neering work, and presents appropriate recommendations.
In Alba v. Board of Registration for Professional Engineers &
Land Surveyors" the applicant sought a license under the successful practice provision, but it was denied on the grounds that
he did not have twelve years in "responsible charge of important
engineering projects," and that he had previously failed certain
examinations. The court found the board acted in excess of its
authority in interpreting the "successful practice" provision in
the statute to require successful completion of an examination
47. LA. R.S. 37:692 (1950).
48. 248 So.2d 367 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
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in addition to the other requirements. It also rejected an emasculating interpretation of what constituted "responsible charge
of important engineering projects"; the board had taken the
position that an engineer could not be in responsible charge
unless he was a registered electrical engineer, an obviously
anomalous requirement to impose on one who was aspiring to
become a registered electrical engineer. The court also affirmed
the procedure of according a trial de novo on the appeal from
the board, since the statute provided no hearing at the administrative level; in these circumstances the district judge was
authorized to fully substitute judgment for that of the board
and to direct registration of the applicant.
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAmINERS

The practice of medicine is defined by statute as either holding out one's self to the public as being engaged in the business
of diagnosing or curing disease, infirmity, or defect, or examining any person for such purpose.49 Nonetheless, chiropractors
continue their attempts to practice their art without a requisite
medical certificate, and the board of medical examiners continue
to invoke the injunctive powers of the courts to stop them whenever apprehended. Two such cases came to the Second Circuit
during the term. In Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Patterson,50 the evidence consisted of pamphlets urging
chiropractic treatment for disease, and injury, appointment
cards, and stationery of the "doctor." This evidence was deemed
sufficient to prove a holding out to the public as a doctor of chiropractic without a required medical license. In the second case,
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Walton,51 the
chiropractor sought to defend on the ground that, while he had
been proven to have diagnosed a "pinched nerve caused by a
subluxation of the vertebrae" and attempted a cure by "adjustment," "holding out" as a doctor of chiropractic had not been
proven since there was no pamphlet evidence suggesting chiropractic cures nor was the chiropractor known locally as a "doctor." The Second Circuit noted, however, that since the regulatory statute is written in the disjunctive, proof of either the
49. LA. R.S. 37:1261 (1950).
50. 236 So.2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
51. 240 So.2d 793 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970).
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practice of chiropractic or the holding out of oneself as a doctor
of chiropractic would make the statute applicable.5 2
SCHOOL BOARDS AND SCHOOL AssocIATIoNs
Hayes v. Orleans Parish School Board,5 8 decided by our
supreme court at last term, laid to rest an issue which might
have become troublesome in an era of burgeoning federal aid
programs to the public schools. In the Hayes case a tenured
consultant in the Orleans Parish school system had been appointed, at a higher rate of compensation, to a supervisory position in a federally funded program; upon termination of the
program, the tenured teacher was reassigned to her original
consultant position. She sought to enjoin the school board from
taking such action except upon charges and hearing. Our supreme court concluded that this protective procedure must be
limited to regular positions in the school system maintained by
recurring state or local revenues. The court concluded that any
other interpretation would lead to the absurd result of freezing
employees into higher salaried positions with no assurance of
adequate revenues to pay them after the termination of federal
aid. Thus, transfers into lesser positions brought about by the
termination of federal aid programs were held to be within the
general powers of administration of school boards without limitation by tenure restrictions.
A series of recent cases, beginning with the 1969 case of
Marino v. Waters,54 have brought for review before the courts
of appeal regulations of the Louisiana High School Athletic
Association, an ancillary association of the state schools. A basic
function of the association is to establish and enforce rules for
the eligibility of participants in inter-scholastic athletics; given
the intensity of interest in sports it was probably inevitable that
its rulings on eligibility would be questioned in the courts. While
there is no provision for judicial review of such regulations, an
allegation that a ruling impinges upon the constitutional rights
of a potential participant, together with allegations of irreparable harm imposed or threatened, has made the injunction available to test the constitutionality and legality of such rulings.
The alleged "property right" in issue is the potential football
52. LA. R.B. 37:1261 (1950).
53. 256 La. 677, 237 So.2d 681 (1970).
54. 220 So.2d 802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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scholarship at the college and university level which would be
lost as a result of a ruling of ineligibility in high school.
In Marino, the court was unwilling to characterize such
future potential as a property right, but rather deemed it a privilege which the school, and the association whose rules the school
followed, could withdraw from a student without impingement
upon constitutional rights. Assuming, however, that the interest
in eligibility was a constitutionally protected interest, the court
cited jurisprudence to the effect that "in the absence of mistake,
fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness the decision of the association
will be accepted by the court." 5 Here, marriage of the participant had rendered him ineligible in the school which he was
attending, and his parents had admittedly moved to another
district solely for the purpose of assisting their son in attaining
eligibility to play football in a school which permitted married
participants. The ruling of the association that the move was
not bona fide within the association regulations was the basis
for the present injunctive proceeding. The court found that the
regulation bore a reasonable relationship to the objective, namely
prevention of improper recruiting, and was applied in a completely non-discriminatory manner to all schools and students;
the injunction was thus ordered recalled.
In David v. Louisiana High School AthZetic Association,56 a
student sought a declaratory judgment of an eligibility ruling
and an injunction against the association's prohibiting him from
playing. Although the trial court had dismissed the petition
after trial on the ground that it stated no cause of action, the
court of appeal nonetheless heard the matter on the merits,
affirming the dismissal. The court found the eligibility ruling
not "so arbitrary, unreasonable, or incorrect as to justify intervention in the internal affairs of the association." Sanders v.
Louisiana High School Athletic Association,57 is of interest primarily because of its holding as to venue. The court found the
athletic association to be a domestic unincorporated association
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure as to venue matters,
and noted that article 73 provided that an action against joint
or solidary obligors may be brought in any parish of proper
55. Id. at 807, quoting from State v. Judges of the Court of Common
Pleas, 173 Ohio 239, 248, 181 N.E.2d 261, 267 (1962).
56. 244 So.2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
57. 242 So.2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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venue as to any obligor who is made a defendant. It was then
held that the suit was properly brought in the venue of the high
school since both the association and the high school were being
sued on an "obligation of the association." The "obligation" was
presumably the duty of the association and the high school to
interpret and apply its eligibility regulations in a non-arbitrary
and non-discriminatory manner.
STATE BANK COIiMISSIONER

In First National Bank of Abbeville v. Sehrt,5s the commissioner issued a conditional certificate of authority to Gulf Coast
Bank in Abbeville after informally hearing protests against the
issuance by the existing banks. Protesting banks then sought
an injunction to prevent the commissioner from issuing a final
certificate of authority. Protestants urged that since no formal
hearing was granted to them, the commissioner's decision was
arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of due process of law. They
also urged that denial of a hearing violated the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act which provides that "[iln an adjudication, all parties who do not waive their rights shall be afforded
an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice." 59 The court
of appeal, in accordance with the legislative intent, held that
the act requires an administrative hearing only if either the
substantive regulatory statute requires decisions of the agency
to be made after notice and hearing or there is a constitutional
requirement of hearing.6° Since the banking statute requires
only that the commissioner shall examine the qualifications,
responsibility and standing of the organizers prior to issuance
of a certificate, the court found no hearing required. The court
also concluded that no constitutional right to hearing existed,
since the only interest of the protestors which was affected was
their interest in being free from competition, an interest which
was not a constitutionally protected right.61 In the circumstances
the court affirmed the power of the legislature to regulate banking and entry into the business of banking through administra58. 246 So.2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
59. L . R.S. 49:955(A) (Supp. 1966).

60. The statute achieves this objective by defining adjudication as agency
process for formulation of a decision or order and the latter as "final disposition . . . required by constitution or statute to be determined on the
record after notice and opportunity for an agency hearing ....
" Id. §
951(1), (3) (Supp. 1966).
61. 246 So.2d 382, 384 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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tive action which did not include affording full party status or
a hearing to protesting competitor banks. The court affirmed,
however, that such protestants have standing to require judicial
review of the commissioner's issuance of certificates. In describing the scope of such review, the court chose to be guided by a
recent statement of the Third Circuit announcing that
"[G]enerally, the scope of judicial review of administrative
agencies, although varying with the statutes involved, is
limited to a determination of whether the action of the
agency was: (1) in accordance with the authority and formalities of the statutes; (2) supported by substantial evi'6 2
dence; and (3) arbitrary or in abuse of discretion.
Noting also that a presumption of validity attaches to administrative enactments, with the burden of proving invalidity upon
the opponent, the court concluded that the burden had not been
carried and that there was substantial evidence to support the
conclusion of the commissioner. A dissenting judge was of the
opinion that a formal hearing should have been granted by the
administrative agency under the Louisiana Administrative Procedure act on the theory that state due process could justifiably
be deemed to protect the interest of competing banks to the
extent of requiring that a full hearing be afforded them. 8
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS

In State, Department of Highways v. Poole,6 4 a landowner
sought to nullify an expropriation of his property on the ground
that the resolution of expropriation by the department of highways did not receive the legally required two-thirds vote of a
statutory membership of nine. 65 The board was found to be short
one member by virtue of a violation of the prohibition against
a board member succeeding himself, two other members being
absent; a favorable vote of five was thus less than two-thirds
of the statutory membership. After some vacillation, a court of
62. Id. at 385, citing Moffltt v. Calcasieu Parish School Bd., 179 So.2d 537
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). Since the Administrative Procedure Act provides
for the broader review of the manifest error review rule, an appellant could
presumably insist upon such review unless a substantive regulatory statute
itself provided for narrower review. LA. R.S. 49:964(G)(6) (Supp. 1966).
63. 246 So.2d 382, 389-90 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
64. 243 So.2d 539 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
65. LA. R.S. 48:422 (1950).
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appeal reached the conclusion that the statutory language could
be interpreted to mean that a two-thirds vote of the members
of the board legally appointed and serving constituted legal
action, provided the meeting was otherwise lawful. Applying
this analysis, there were six legally appointed members present,
so that five of these votes for the expropriation resolution was
sufficient to validate it under the two-thirds rule. In Branton v.
Parker,0 a case involving the validity of a vote of the legislature, the court had noted that a vote of two-thirds of the members of each chamber was held to mean "a vote of two-thirds of
a quorum present, provided the vote equals or exceeds a majority of the total elected membership of each chamber." 7 Presumably, if that proviso were applied here, it would require that
the favorable vote equal or exceed a majority of the total statutory membership of the board. The department also argued that
the owners' withdrawal of a deposit from the registry of the
court was, in effect, a waiver of any illegalities in the expropriation procedure. However, the court held that where the
landowner had answered the suit and hence clearly evidenced
his objection to the taking, there could be no waiver on a theory
of acquiescence under the St. Julien doctrine. 86
STATE MARKET COMMISSION

In Stanford v. Henry, 9 a sweet potato grower sought to
compel the state market commission by mandamus to issue a
weevil inspection certificate in order that his crop might be
marketed. The grower proposed to ship uncured sweet potatoes
to fresh market outlets in violation of a regulation of the commission that such shipments could not be made after a designated day. The trial court found the statute unconstitutional as
being without adequate standards to guide the agency in the
exercise of authority delegated to control the inspection and
marketing of farm products; the commission was ordered to
issue an appropriate certificate. Thereafter, in Pierce v. Stanford,70 the commission sought to enjoin the grower from further
shipment of sweet potatoes, although shipments had already
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

233
Id.
243
237
237

So.2d 278
at 288.
So.2d 539,
So.2d 418
So.2d 419

(La. App. Ist Cir. 1970).
547 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
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been made pursuant to the court ordered certificate. Since the
commission requested only an injunction and not a declaratory
judgment, the court ruled the matter moot and refused to review the validity of the regulation.
In 1944 the state market commission was authorized to lend,
participate, or guarantee up to twenty-five percent of commercial loans for the construction of agricultural plants; the constitutional amendment authorized the legislature to make necessary appropriations. Presumably because no such appropriations
were being made, the commission sought statutory authorization
for the sale of bonds in an amount not to exceed two million
dollars; the funds were to be used by the commission to make
loans for certain types of agricultural plants. The statute was
successfully attacked in Fuselier v. State Market Commission7'
on the ground that it violated a general constitutional provision
against the issuance of bonds except for the purpose of constructing state capital improvements, repelling invasion, or suppressing insurrection.7 2 The court rejected an argument that,
because the proceeds would be used for the construction of a
privately-owned rice drier, the requirement that funds be used
for capital improvements was satisfied; the court squarely held
that "the capital improvements must be made by a state board
'78
or a state agency.
LOUISIANA MILK COiAnvSSION

In 1962 the Louisiana Milk Commission was authorized to
"establish the minimum prices at which... [fluid milk products]
are sold to any person"; all reference to dock prices provided in
prior legislation 4 was deleted. The objective of the act was to
protect small handlers and distributors from being driven out
by large operators. Thus minimum wholesale prices, set high
enough to keep small handlers and distributors in business, were
also to be charged the large handler or distributor for his larger
quantities; he could not increase his share of sales by obtaining
71. 238 So.2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
72. LA. CONST., art. IV, § 2.
73. 238 So.2d 243, 245 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
74. LA. R.S. 40:940.19(5) (Supp. 1962), commented upon, Louisiana Legiszation of 1962: A Symposium-Public Law, 23 LA. L. REv. 70 (1962). A dock
price is the lower wholesale price applicable to a transaction when the retailer
accepts delivery of the dairy product at the processing plant.
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quantity savings and passing on savings to a retailer. To implement this objective, the commission fixed one minimum wholesale price and one retail price for fluid milk products in each
area. In National Dairy Products Corp. v. Louisiana Milk Commission,75 a large processor unsuccessfully requested the commission to fix an additional wholesale dock price for the area.
On review, a court of appeal affirmed the commission in denying the request and held that it was the legislative intent in 1962
to take from the commission the power to fix dock prices and,
in order to achieve the above-mentioned statutory objectives, to
limit its power to fixing one wholesale price in an area.
This holding would seem to have disposed of the matter.
However, the court went on, in dicta, to review the procedures,
also assigned as error, utilized by the commission in making its
decision. The court agreed with the commission that the determination as to whether it did or did not have power to fix dock
prices was a "rule making" matter as to which no requirement
of a hearing had been made by the legislature." As a consequence, the commission was free, as it had concluded it was, to
consider all relevant data from interested persons as well as data
disclosed by its own investigation. It was also free, without
violating the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act" or due
process, to incorporate material from an earlier record into the
present proceeding. As noted, the court might have contented
itself with a finding that the interpretation by the commission
was not "arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion... ,17
However, the court chose to review as fully as if an adjudication
had taken place and to conclude that the decision was not "manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substan79
tial evidence contained in the records."
75. 236 So.2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
76. The commission is only directed to hold fully adjudicatory "public
hearings prior to establishing or changing any price . . ." and to "determine
after a hearing . . . the logical and reasonable Commission Sales Area
.... " LA. R.S. 40:940.19(6)(7)

(1950). Rule making hearings would thus be

governed by the Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act which requires
only that "interested persons [shall be afforded] reasonable opportunity to
submit data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing ....
" Id. § 953A(2).
77. LA. R.S. 49:951, 953 (Supp. 1966).
78. Id.

§ 964(G)(5).

79. 236 So.2d 596, 601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).

